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NATIONALIZATION AND NECESSITY: TAKINGS AND A
DOCTRINE OF ECONOMIC EMERGENCY
NESTOR M. DAVIDSON*
Serious economic crises have recurred with regularity throughout
our history. So too have government takeovers of failing private
companies in response, and the downturn of the last decade was no
exception. At the height of the crisis, the federal government nation-
alized several of the country's largest private enterprises. Recently,
shareholders in these firms have sued the federal government, argu-
ing that the takeovers constituted a taking of their property without
just compensation in violation of the Fifth Amendment.
This Essay argues that for the owners of companies whose failure
would raise acute economic spillovers, nationalization without the
obligation to pay just compensation should be recognized as a natu-
ral extension of the doctrine of emergency in takings. Public officials
must be able to respond quickly to serious economic threats, no less
than when facing the kinds of imminent physical or public health
crises-such as wildfires and contagion-that have been a staple of
traditional takings jurisprudence. Far from an affront to the rule of
law, this reflection of necessity through an extension of emergency
doctrine would reaffirm the flexibility inherent in property law in
times of crisis.
INTRODUCTION
On the morning of Thursday, September 4, 2008, with the global
economy teetering on the edge of collapse, Treasury Secretary Henry
Paulson came to the Oval Office to brief President Bush on the chal-
lenges facing Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, two troubled private com-
panies at the heart of the U.S. mortgage finance system. "For the
good of the country," Paulson would later write in his memoir of the
crisis, "I had proposed that we seize control of the companies," and
that the Administration do so swiftly, without warning. As Paulson
said to the President that morning, the "first sound they'll hear is
* Professor and Associate Dean for Academic Affairs, Fordham University School of Law.
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their heads hitting the floor."' The next day, Paulson summoned top
executives from Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac to the White House and
dropped the ax, nationalizing companies that held over $5 trillion
worth of mortgage-related assets.2
Although there was a widely held, if erroneous, belief at the time
that Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac were governmental entities, the
companies in fact were publicly traded, with hundreds of millions of
privately held shares outstanding on the eve of their takeover. Given
this, the privatization of these companies may have seemed a remark-
able intervention in the market and a sui generis infringement on
the property rights of shareholders and other economic stakeholders
in these companies. But these were by no means the only instances
of the government taking control of significant private enterprises
during the recent economic crisis (or, for that matter, in past eco-
nomic crises). The technical mechanisms varied in each instance,
but the practical results were the same for General Motors ("GM"),
the American International Group ("AIG"), and other companies
nationalized during the chaotic early days of the Great Recession.3
Shareholders and others who claim an economic stake in these
firms have recently filed several suits raising, among other claims,
Takings Clause challenges to the takeovers.4 These claims squarely
raise the question whether public officials have the authority and
necessary latitude to respond to overriding threats to the national
economy without compensating those whose economic interests have
been harmed as a consequence. These cases thus have the potential
1. HENRY PAULSON, ON THE BRINK: INSIDE THE RACE TO STOP THE COLLAPSE OF THE
GLOBAL FINANCIAL SYSTEM 1 (2010).
2. I use the term nationalization intentionally to describe instances of the government-
and it is usually the federal government-taking control of private enterprises, recognizing
that the term has traditionally carried negative connotations. Doing so, however, recognizes
the reality of this particular economic intervention in our constitutional discourse.
3. See generally Steven M. Davidoff& David Zaring, Regulation by Deal: The Governments
Response to the Financial Crisis, 61 ADMIN. L. REV. 463 (2009).
4. See infra Part II. Shareholders who held Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac stock at the time
of their nationalization are seeking just compensation on the order of $41 billion. See Complaint
at 63, Wash. Fed. v. United States, No. 1: 13-cv-00385-MMS (Fed. Cl. June 10, 2013) [hereinafter
Complaint, Washington Federal]. Similarly, one of AIG's largest shareholders-and former
CEO-is asserting takings claims through both direct and shareholder derivative claims on be-
half of the company, seeking just compensation across these claims of at least $55 billion. See
Starr Int'l Co. v. United States, 106 Fed. Cl. 50, recons. denied, 107 Fed. Cl. 374 (Fed. Cl. 2012).
5. It can be argued that the nationalization of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac fell into a dif-
ferent category because they were originally congressionally chartered (hence the descriptor
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to shape the policy landscape for future economic crises, as well as
important aspects of our understanding of takings law.
This Essay's core claim is that the nationalization of private enter-
prises whose failure would pose particularly significant systemic risks
can be justified in times of economic crisis without a mandate to pro-
vide the owners of those firms just compensation.6 Overriding neces-
sity has always placed an important limitation on the absolutism of
common-law property rights, and there is likewise a well-established
doctrine of emergency in the constitutional law of property. This strain
in the jurisprudence has traditionally been invoked in contexts such
as disasters and public health crises, giving public officials the ability
to create firebreaks in the face of wildfires or stop the spread of conta-
gion without compensating those whose property interests are harmed
as a result.'
Although the constitutional doctrine of emergency in takings law
has not historically included economic exigencies, its logic of immi-
nent necessity clearly applies to firms whose failure pose systemic
risks in our increasingly interconnected economy. The underlying
rationale has always been that officials must be free to act quickly
and decisively to forestall great harm and that property injured as
a consequence is a reasonable burden for owners to bear. The same
can be said for nationalization as it has been practiced in times of eco-
nomic crisis. "Too big to fail" does not always mean too important to
require compensation for those harmed when the failure of such firms
is prevented, but under the right circumstances, that is precisely the
constitutional latitude that public officials require.
"government-sponsored enterprise," or GSE). However, these particular GSEs had clearly been
privatized (even if they remained heavily regulated).
6. Nationalization potentially implicates other constitutional provisions, most notably
the Due Process and Equal Protection clauses, as well as statutory and regulatory issues,
many of which have been raised in the recently filed cases.
7. See infra text accompanying notes 58-67. There are two related doctrines that have
some relevance to the constitutional landscape of takings and nationalization. The first is the
version of the emergency doctrine in constitutional property that has arisen in the military
context. See infra note 61. The second is a contested doctrine of incompatible economic imper-
atives exemplified by the cedar rust tree destruction blessed by the Supreme Court in Miller
u. Schoene, 276 U.S. 272 (1928). See infra text accompanying notes 82-83. For reasons elab-
orated below, this Essay does not rely primarily on either of these traditions to craft a doc-
trine of economic emergency in takings, although each sheds some light on the boundaries of
necessity in constitutional property.
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An extension of the emergency doctrine to such economic actors
hardly means that all property rights are casually defeasible in times
of crisis, as some critics of nationalization suggest.8 Nor would it un-
dermine the rule of law to acknowledge that the nature of the harms
at issue in emergencies can evolve. But it does mean that the legal
boundaries of property in crisis are-and should be-more flexible
than such critiques suggest.
Let me address two conceptual objections at the outset about the
nature of the doctrinal claims at issue, as an initial instinct may be
that there is no actual takings issue in nationalization. Consistent
with our general historical approach, every instance of nationalization
in the most recent economic crisis was accompanied by the invest-
ment of significant public resources in companies that were under-
stood at the time to be failing. And, in each instance, the relevant
firm at least nominally authorized the takeover.9
This might suggest categorically that no takings liability could
attach, but these conditions do not necessarily obviate that potential
for takings liability. This is because shareholders would not neces-
sarily have fared as poorly as they did had these companies gone
through bankruptcy proceedings (or had the firms somehow found
buyers), and also because the public investments seem not to have
actually compensated shareholders. Moreover, shareholders are vig-
orously contesting the voluntary nature of the takeovers, and board
consent is not necessarily a bar to shareholder claims.o
There is more to be said about these and related doctrinal issues,
but given that takings challenges to nationalization are quite active
and likely to be a factor in any future crisis, I am advancing a less
technical, more foundational argument in this Essay." Property is a
constitutive project that, despite the claims of some theorists for uni-
versal norms, develops over time through the accretion of legal and
8. See infra text accompanying notes 85-89.
9. See infra note 30.
10. See infra text accompanying note 57.
11. The technical merits of the takings claims that have been raised recently are important,
and I will review them briefly in Part II. But this Essay will not attempt to weigh definitively
the many substantive and procedural nuances these claims raise, many of which require sub-
stantial additional factual development to resolve. Moreover, even if the specific suits now
pending from the wave of nationalization during the Great Recession do not succeed, the issues
they raise are live, and likely to recur in future economic crises, so understanding the dimen-
sions of takings liability in nationalization is important regardless.
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cultural responses to particular challenges. Nationalization raises not
only important questions about the intersection of corporate law and
constitutional property, but also provides a telling window through
which to observe the boundary between individual rights and com-
munity obligation instantiated in that evolving property law.
1. NATIONALIZATION IN TIMES OF ECONOMIC CRISIS
Financial crises are a seemingly inevitable feature of our economic
system and have recurred with distressing regularity throughout
American history. Amidst the tremendous variety of public policy
responses throughout those cycles, one regulatory tool that public
officials have repeatedly deployed has been the takeover of private
companies, particularly where the potential collapse of those compa-
nies has posed larger economic threats.
In the Great Depression, for example, the Federal Reconstruction
Finance Corporation took ownership interests in thousands of banks
to prevent their failure.12 The Resolution Trust Corporation similarly
took over and restructured the assets of many failing thrifts during
the savings and loan crisis of the late 1980s.
Nationalization was a particularly prominent-if narrowly fo-
cused-tool during the recent Great Recession.13 As to Fannie Mae
12. See Steve Lohr, U.S. Not Always Averse to Nationalization, Despite Its Free-Market
Image, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 13, 2008), http://www.nytimes.com/2008/10/13/business/worldbusiness
/13iht-nationalize.4.16915416.html (noting that the Resolution Finance Corporation made
investments in banks in the 1930s equivalent to between $400 and $500 billion in current
dollars). One of the more direct precursors of nationalization during the recent Great Recession
was the takeover of Continental Illinois National Bank and Trust. In 1984, the bank was one
of the ten largest in the country, and the federal government, fearing that a failure would cause
a financial panic, took an eighty percent ownership stake, which was held until the bank was
sold a decade later to Bank of America. Id.
13. See Marcel Kahan & Edward B. Rock, When the Government Is the Controlling
Shareholder, 89 TEX. L. REV. 1293, 1299-300 (2011) (noting that the federal government be-
came the controlling shareholder in companies such as GMAC and owned as much as 34% of
outstanding Citigroup common stock); see also Deborah Solomon et al., U.S. to Buy Stakes in
Nation's Largest Banks Recipients Include Citi, Bank of America, Goldman; Government
Pressures All to Accept Money as Part of Broadened Rescue Effort, WALL ST. J., Oct. 14, 2008,
at Al (discussing federal bank investments); Damian Paletta, Lingling Wei & Ruth Simon,
IndyMac Reopens, Halts Foreclosures on Its Loans, WALL ST. J., July 15, 2008, at C1 (describing
the takeover of IndyMac). All told, the companies that the federal government nationalized had
a collective economic footprint in the trillions of dollars-yes, with a t-and hundreds of millions
of publicly traded shares. That said, nationalization was a relatively small part of a set of much
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and Freddie Mac, the Housing and Economic Recovery Act of 2008
("HERA"), 14 authorized the Federal Housing Finance Agency ("FHFA")
to place the companies in conservatorship."5 Facing mounting evi-
dence of potential threat to the national economy from the instability
of the housing enterprises, FHFA acted on this authority in September
2008, placing both companies in conservatorship.16
AIG followed a slightly different pattern, although the end result
was similarly federal control. At the moment the economic crisis
was reaching its most precarious point, AIG stood at the center of
a significant system of risk associated with housing finance.17 AIG
had sold a high volume of credit default swaps, a form of insurance
used by investors in collateralized debt obligations ("CDOs") such as
mortgage-backed securities." However, the housing crisis caused
counterparties to start to make claims and collateral calls against this
insurance, causing a liquidity crisis for the company. In September
2008, the Federal Reserve Bank of New York agreed to provide AIG
with a two-year revolving line of credit of up to $85 billion, and ob-
tained control of the company in exchange.
GM was a third variation on nationalization arising from Great
Recession, albeit one that has not generated shareholder takings
litigation primarily because it resulted in bankruptcy. Although still
broader interventions early in the crisis that primarily consisted of subsidies to shore up various
market sectors without any material change in ownership structure.
14. Pub. L. No. 110-289, 122 Stat. 2654 (2008) (codified as amended in scattered sections
of 12 U.S.C. (Supp. II 2008)).
15. See 12 U.S.C. § 4617 (2012).
16. The technical means through which the companies were nationalized involved votes
by Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac's Boards of Directors to consent to the conservatorships, one
of the grounds provided under § 4617, although there were arguably other grounds under the
statute available for an involuntary imposition. The conservatorship came as part of a broad-
based assumption of the GSEs' risks and the taking of equity by the federal government in
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. Specifically, Treasury received $1 billion in senior preferred
stock and warrants to obtain 79.9 percent ownership of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac's common
stock. In exchange, Treasury provided the companies with a line of credit (originally up to $100
billion, later increased) and began purchasing Fannie and Freddie-issued securities to fore-
stall a collapse in the pricing of such securities. See Cynthia M. Hajost, From Oversight to
Conservatorship: What Does the Housing and Economic Recovery Act of 2008 Hold For GSEs
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac?, 18 J. AFFORDABLE HOuS. & CMTY. DEV. L. 3, 7 (2008).
17. William K. Sjostrom, Jr., The AIG Bailout, 66 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 943, 946 (2009);
see generally MAURICE R. GREENBERG & LAWRENCE A. CUNNINGHAM, THE AIG STORY (2013).
18. Credit default swaps are contracts that provide, in exchange for ongoing payments by
counterparty, "that the party writing the CDS is obligated to pay the counterparty the par
value of the debt instrument in the event the instrument defaults." Starr Int'l Co. v. United
States, 106 Fed. Cl. 50, 55, recons. denied, 107 Fed. Cl. 374 (Fed. Cl. 2012).
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the world's largest automaker at the time, by the peak of the crisis
in 2008 GM faced serious liquidity challenges from a combination of
the general economic slowdown and a rise in fuel costs. 9 From late
2008 through the spring of 2009, the federal government provided
GM with a series of loans in what would eventually become a $50
billion rescue plan.20 Through a structured bankruptcy, the federal
government eventually came to hold a nearly 60 percent stake in
the company.2
Common to each of these instances of nationalization-and many
other examples in the past-is that the company involved posed sys-
temic economic risk, which is to say that if they were to fail, the conse-
quences would likely have induced larger market failures. The demise
of any firm costs jobs, risks undermining confidence in some sector
of the economy, or otherwise redounds beyond the boundaries of the
company at issue. But in the modern economy, certain firms raise the
risk of particularly acute spillover effects. Scholars have debated the
bounds of what constitutes an institution that is, in the words of the
Treasury Department, "systemically important,"2 2 but the primary
focus in the context of nationalization has been on threats of rapidly
escalating market failures of great significance.2 3
For financial firms, this can relate to liquidity for related firms and
collateral cascades with counterparties. 2 4 For non-financial firms,
19. See generally STEVEN RATTNER, OVERHAUL: AN INSIDER'S ACCOUNT OF THE OBAMA
ADMINISTRATION S EMERGENCY RESCUE OF THE AUTO INDUSTRY (2010).
20. See Brent J. Horton, The TARP Bailout of GM: A Legal, Historical, and Literary
Critique, 14 TEX. REV. L. & POL. 217, 275 (2010).
21. See Neil King Jr. & Sharon Terlep, GM Collapses into Government's Arms, WALL ST.
J. (June 2, 2009, 12:01 AM), http://online.wsj.com/article/SB 124385428627671889.html.
22. In the early days after the crisis, the Treasury Department focused in particular on firms
"whose combination of size, leverage, and interconnectedness could pose a threat to financial
stability if [they] failed." U.S. DEPT OF THE TREASURY, FINANCIAL REGULATORY REFORM-A
NEW FOUNDATION: REBUILDING FINANCIAL SUPERVISION AND REGULATION 21 (2009), available
athttp://www.treasury.gov/initiatives/Documents/FinalReport-web.pdf. Seealso MaziarPeihani,
Systemically Important Financial Institutions (SIFIs): An Analysis of Current Regulatory
Development, 29 BANKING & FIN. L. REV. 129, 131-32 (2013) (arguing for a definition of systemic
risk at the institutional level that focuses on the size of an institution, its interconnectedness,
its complexity, and the concentration or dominance of a given firm in a market).
23. See generally Iman Anabtawi & Steven L. Schwarcz, Regulating Systemic Risk:
Towards an Analytical Framework, 86 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1349 (2011). Adam Levitin argues
that systemic risk cannot be understood solely in terms of the economic impact of a given
firm's failure, but rather must be approached as a question of the limits of socially acceptable
harm. See Adam Levitin, In Defense of Bailouts, 99 GEO. L.J. 435 (2011).
24. Edward Morrison, for example, notes three sources of systemic risk for financial firms.
First, when a firm stops payment on its debt and similar obligations, there can be a cascading
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the size of an enterprise can embed its influence not only on investors
and creditors, but also on employees, franchisees, suppliers, and other
economic actors in the orbit of that firm. These significant macro-
scale spillover effects may impact financial markets, as with AIG,
or housing markets, as with Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, or even
broad consumer and labor markets, as with GM.25 In each arena, the
failure of a subset of truly significant and interconnected economic
entities can have macroeconomic consequences that are every bit as
tangibly harmful as the physical and public health threats encom-
passed in traditional emergency doctrine.
The critical defining characteristic of systemic risk in this context
is not simply external harm rippling out from collapse-that is nec-
essary, but hardly sufficient-but rather that a particular firm's
failure is likely to cascade and threaten large sectors of the econ-
omy, if not the economy in toto. Financial markets and the firms
that operate in them are increasingly entwined, a phenomenon that
the financial reporter Andrew Sorkin describes as the "new ultra-
interconnectedness."26 Just as ordinary nuisance involves harm to
the use and enjoyment of one owner's property arising from activities
on another owner's property-spillovers that cross physical property
lines-so too can economic contagion leap from firm to firm, and mar-
ket to market almost instantaneously. By whatever definition is used
to identify such firms, it seems clear that each of the major companies
nationalized in the most recent crisis qualifies.
Given this risk, it is hardly surprising that another common ele-
ment of each instance of nationalization in the recent crisis was that
effect throughout markets that depend on steady payment streams, including derivative and
insurance markets. Second, the threat of liquidation incentivizes contractual counterparties
to terminate existing contracts. Finally, a failing financial institution will cause counter-
parties that have hedge risks through liquid securities to liquidate that margin, which will
reduce the value of that collateral for all market participants. See Edward R. Morrison, Is the
Bankruptcy Code an Adequate Mechanism for Resolving the Distress of Systemically Important
Institutions?, 82 TEMP. L. REv. 449, 451-52 (2009).
25. The reaction to the failure of Lehman Brothers exemplifies the risks involved. When
Lehman filed for bankruptcy on September 15, 2008, the Dow Jones Industrial Average dropped
more than 500 points, wiping out roughly $700 billion in value from a broad range of invest-
ment portfolios. The Lehman Brothers' bankruptcy involved "8,000 subsidiaries and affiliates,
$600 billion in assets and liabilities and more than 100,000 creditors." Peihani, supra note 22,
at 130.
26. ANDREW Ross SORKIN, Too BIG TO FAIL: THE INSIDE STORY OF How WALL STREET AND
WASHINGTON FOUGHT TO SAVE THE FINANCIAL SYSTEM FROM CRISIS-AND THEMSELVES 5 (2009).
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federal control came with significant public subsidies.27 These in-
cluded, most prominently, direct subsidies, lines of credit and other
financing, assumptions of liability, debt guarantees and similar loan
backstops.2 8 This might seem to take nationalization immediately
out of the realm of takings and into the realm of "givings."2 9 But there
is a difference between a grant of public funds to an entity, even a sub-
sidy that carries significant strings, and one that accompanies the
transfer of functional or actual ownership or control, even if the ulti-
mate net financial result for the entity involved is positive (or even sig-
nificantly positive). Moreover, a government takeover can result in a
significant or even complete elimination of the economic value of pre-
existing ownership rights in the entity, despite the subsidy. Indeed,
it is arguable that in many instances public funds provided to failing
companies during the Great Recession did not compensate those with
ownership interests prior to the takeover but rather were used to keep
the entities operating and prioritize the claims of other stakeholders.
The Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, and AIG nationalizations, more-
over, each resulted from an agreement with, or at least acquiescence
by, the company's Board of Directors.30 Shareholders challenging these
takeovers have made the obvious counterarguments about duress,
asserting in essence that any acquiescence was illusory, and it is not
implausible that the courts will credit these arguments.
Finally, with some notable exceptions-Fannie Mae and Freddie
Mac in particular-nationalization in times of economic crisis tends
to be short-lived and targeted at immediate market-failure cas-
cades, rather than some long-term governmental self-interest.31 The
27. In the case of GM, for example, the total public investment reached roughly $50 billion.
See Horton, supra note 20, at 275. AIG's line of credit eventually reached over $182 billion.
Pam Selvarajah, The AIG Bailout and AIG's Prospects for Repaying Government Loans, 29
REV. BANKING & FIN. L. 363, 365 (2010).
28. See Jeffrey Manns, Building Better Bailouts: The Case for a Long-Term Investment
Approach, 63 FLA. L. REV. 1349, 1359, 1358-65 (2011); see generally Levitin, supra note 23.
29. Cf Abraham Bell & Gideon Parchomovsky, Givings, 111 YALE L.J. 547 (2001).
30. See Winston Sale, Effect of the Conservatorship of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac on
Affordable Housing, 18-SPG J. AFFORDABLE HOUSING & COMMUNITY DEv. L. 287, 299 (2009);
Sjostrom, supra note 17, at 976-77. In the GM case, again, the Board of Directors approved the
financing structure that placed the federal government effectively in control of the company.
See Sheryl Gay Stolberg & Bill Vlasic, U.S. Lays Down Terms for Auto Bailout, N.Y. TIMES
(Mar. 30, 2009), http://www.nytimes.com/2009/03/30/business/30auto.htmlpagewanted=all.
31. Another historical example of nationalization of a significant failing company that can
be put in the long-term column of the ledger is Amtrak, which was created under the Rail
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prevailing ethos behind this short-term orientation was expressed
by then-Treasury Secretary Paulson early in the crisis, when he
said that "[g] overnment owning a stake in any private U.S. company
is objectionable to most Americans-me included."3 2 Accordingly, the
federal government entirely divested its ownership stake in AIG by
December 2010 (making a profit of slightly under $23 billion).3 3 GM
was similarly reprivatized by December 2012.34 The fact that govern-
mental control was temporary does not necessarily change the tak-
ings calculus at the time of each takeover" but does shape how one
might evaluate the purpose and legitimacy of the intervention.
All of this underscores a pattern of nationalization in which state
intervention is focused on the potential macroeconomic consequences
of the failure to act in times of crisis, with a primary purpose to re-
inforce faltering markets and limit the large-scale consequences of
the potential collapse of firms that are particularly important from a
systemic-risk perspective. The question remains, however, whether
this type of intervention requires compensation for those whose
Passenger Service Act of 1970. See Laurence E. Tobey, Costs, Benefits, and the Future of
Amtrak, 15 TRANSP. L.J. 245, 253 (1987). The statute led to the public ownership of much of
the nation's private intercity passenger rail service. Id. at 255. By contrast, although the
Consolidated Railway Corporation, or Conrail, was created in the early 1970s to nationalize
certain freight lines of six bankrupt carriers, it was privatized in 1987 and its assets are now
owned by CSX Transportation and Norfolk Southern Railway. See Agis Salpukas, Conrail
Chugs Offinto the Sunset; CSXand Norfolk Southern Take Over, N.Y. TIMES (June 1, 1999),
http://www.nytimes.com/1999/06/0 1/business/conrail-chugs-off-into-the-sunset-csx-and-norfolk
-southern-take-over.html.
32. Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Treasury, Statement by Secretary Henry M. Paulson, Jr.
on Actions To Protect the U.S. Economy (Oct. 14, 2008), available at http://www.treasury.gov
/press-center/press-releases/Pages/hp 1205.aspx.
33. See Jeffrey Sparshott & Erik Holm, End of a Bailout: U.S. Sells Last AIG Shares,
WALL ST. J. (Dec. 11, 2012, 11:08 AM), available at http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB1000
1424127887323339704578172960483282372.
34. Steven Rattner, The Liberation of General Motors, N.Y. TIMES OPINIONATOR BLOG
(Dec. 19, 2012, 7:41 PM), http://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/12/19/the-liberation-of
-general-motors/.
35. There is a basic doctrinal divide in the law of takings when it comes to temporary
takings. For traditional exercises of the power of eminent domain, temporary takings generally
require compensation and the primary question is valuation. For regulatory takings, however,
the question of the duration of a governmental action is itself an aspect of the predicate question
of whether a taking has occurred. See Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg 1Planning
Agency, 535 U.S. 302, 331 (2002). As will be discussed below, the appropriate way to think
about nationalization in the recent crisis is as potential regulatory takings, so the temporal
dimension can be important in evaluating the expectations of those who ownership interest
in entities has been harmed by nationalization.
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property rights are harmed in the name of larger public benefits-the
quintessential question at the heart of every takings claim. Under-
standing that the answer, in general, should be "no" requires an ex-
ploration of the particular takings claims at issue in nationalization.
II. POTENTIAL TAKINGS LIABILITY IN NATIONALIZATION
As I noted at the outset, this wave of nationalization has recently
begun generating significant litigation raising takings challenges on
behalf of shareholders and the companies themselves, through de-
rivative suits. The theory of economic emergency that this Essay
advances does not ultimately turn on whether the current claims
necessarily succeed, given that the issue of economic nationalization
will continue to recur, just as economic crises continue inevitably to
recur. But it is useful, nonetheless, to outline the basic nature of the
claims at issue and acknowledge that, despite their early stages, it
is quite plausible that one or more could succeed.
A. Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac
In June 2013, a group of individual and institutional Fannie Mae
and Freddie Mac shareholders filed a class-action suit, alleging that
the federal government's conservatorship of Fannie Mae and Freddie
Mac constituted an illegal exaction and/or taking of their property
without just compensation.36 The complaint, which seeks roughly
$41 billion in compensation, raises two primary claims. The first is
that the conservatorships were illegally imposed under the terms of
HERA. 7 The second, broader set of charges argue that the con-
servatorship was designed to channel funds from Fannie Mae and
Freddie Mac to other companies (providing the government with a
vehicle to purchase troubled mortgage debt), and ultimately back to
the Treasury."
36. Complaint, Washington Federal, supra note 4, at 50.
37. 12 U.S.C. § 4617. Specifically, they allege that the conservatorship was imposed not in
response to concerns about Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac's financial condition, but rather
because of concerns about the broader health of the financial system. They further allege that
the consent of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac's Boards under § 4617 was coerced. These claims
go to the threshold question of the authority of the government to act and the validity of the
action, not whether the conservatorship constituted a taking of the plaintiffs' property without
just compensation.
38. Complaint, Washington Federal, supra note 4, at 56.
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Specifically, the shareholders assert that they were harmed by
FHFA's order to the companies to cease paying dividends (other than
to the Treasury), the subsequent delisting of the companies' common
and preferred shares from the New York Stock Exchange in June
2010, and by agreements to sweep net profits from the government-
sponsored enterprises ("GSEs") for the Treasury when they returned
to economic stability." The complaint states that the government's
imposition and subsequent administration of conservatorships (where
the government purchased roughly 80% of the companies' stock) ren-
dered the common and preferred shares of the companies virtually
worthless.
The plaintiffs further assert that Treasury did not seek or obtain
the companies' consent to sign stock agreements, and, in drafting the
stock agreements, the Treasury did not take into consideration factors
required by the companies' charters. Though HERA contemplated
conservatorships to return Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac to their pre-
vious financial health, the shareholders argue that the takeovers
went beyond helping the companies and were instead designed to
promote overall growth of the economy by providing increased liquid-
ity to the mortgage market.40 According to the plaintiffs, none of the
conditions required by statute to impose conservatorships existed
because Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac were adequately capitalized
at the time of the conservatorships. 4 1
B. American International Group
On November 21, 2011, Starr International Company, Inc., one of
AIG's largest shareholders (headed by Maurice "Hank" Greenberg,
the former chairman of AIG in the years before the economic crisis),
filed suit challenging the federal takeover. Starr argued that the gov-
ernment illegitimately forced AIG to issue over 562 million shares for
39. Id.
40. Id. at 55.
41. Id. Not all of the challenges to the Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac conservatorships and
the issuance of the net worth sweep are framed as takings claims. Shareholders are also raising
issues such as breach of contract and violations of the Administrative Procedure Act. See, e.g.,
Cane v. FHFA, No. 1:13-cv-01184 (D.D.C. Aug. 1, 2013); Dennis v. FHFA, No. 1:13-cv-01208
(D.D.C. Aug. 1, 2013); Am. European Ins. Co. v. Fed. Nat'l Mortgage Ass'n, No. 1: 13-cv-0 1169
(D.D.C. July 30, 2013); Cacciapelle v. Fed. Nat'1 Mortgage Ass'n, No. 1:13-cv-01149 (D.D.C.
July 29, 2013); Liao v. Lew, No. 1:13-cv-01094 (D.D.C. July 16, 2013); Fairholme Funds, Inc.
v. FHFA, No. 1: 13-cv-01053 (D.D.C. July 10, 2013); Perry Capital, LLC v. Lew, No. 1: 13-cv-01025
(D.D.C. July 7, 2013).
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which the government paid only $500,000,42 and that the government
then forced the company to purchase over $62 billion worth of CDO
assets from AIG counterparties, which, Starr alleged, led to the direct
taking of cash collateral from AIG.4 3 Starr's direct takings claims are
based on the argument that the dilution of shares by the government
undermined both the economic value and the voting power of Starr's
holdings.44 Amid anger from Congress and voters who expressed dis-
belief that AIG would sue the same entity that rescued it from finan-
cial collapse, AIG decided not to join the Starr lawsuit.
C. Assessing the Viability of These Claims
Were there no plausible takings claims in arising from the practice
of nationalization, then it might be unnecessary to evaluate rationales
for justifying the practice, although the issue of economic nationaliza-
tion is likely to recur in future crises. Certainly, if the government
directly seized control of the companies at issue, as it has done at
times in the past,4 5 or similarly directly expropriated the shares of
the owners of those companies, it seems hard to argue that there
would be no threshold issue of takings liability. In those cases, the
government could certainly be challenged on the scope of its author-
ity to act,46 on whether such action met the public use test, or even
on the measure of just compensation.47 But there would be little doubt
42. In June, 2009, AIG undertook a reverse stock split that reduced its outstanding shares
from 3 billion to 150 million, which allowed the conversion of the government's preferred to com-
mon stock in January 2011. Starr Int'l Co. v. United States, 106 Fed. Cl. 50, 58 (Fed. Cl. 2012).
43. Id. at 59. In June 2013, the Court of Federal Claims ruled that Starr's shareholder
derivative claims were barred by application of the business judgment rule because AIG s Board
had considered and rejected them. Starr Int'l Co. v. United States, 1I1Fed. Cl. 459, 471 (Fed.
Cl. 2013).
44. Id. at 482.
45. See Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co.v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 615-28 (1952) (Frankfurter,
J., concurring) (recounting history of industrial seizures).
46. It is well settled, although not without controversy, that the federal government has
the power of eminent domain. See generally William Baude, Rethinking the Federal Eminent
Domain Power, 122 YALE L.J. 1738 (2013). Nationalization-whether through direct eminent
domain, or more often through other means, as was universally the case during the Great
Recession-does not rely on some reserve of federal power implied in other sources but instead
on specific grants of authority by Congress. As noted, the Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, and AIG liti-
gation all assert statutory arguments challenging the basic validity of the federal government's
authority to act.
47. Even with direct expropriation, compensation to shareholders and other stakeholders
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that a taking would have occurred and the questions raised in this
Essay squarely presented.
Nationalization as it unfolded in the Great Recession, however,
presents more of a doctrinal puzzle. The preferred tool to take over
companies during the Great Recession, as noted, was through board
consent. Shareholders are thus arguing that governmental control
had the effect of diluting the value and voting rights of extant shares,
which is essentially a regulatory takings claim.4 8 As such, the claims
might be resolved under the familiar ad-hoc framework the Supreme
Court laid out in Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York City49
or through the total-deprivation-of-economic-value analysis the
Supreme Court set out in Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council.o
As to Lucas, it is conceivable that a shareholder could prevail on
the argument that the relevant intervention had the direct effect of
destroying the value of their shares. The Court in Lucas suggested
that personal property-particularly in regulated industries-falls
outside the categorical rule that applies to land," but lower courts
have been mixed on this question.52 Were a court to apply Lucas-and
not find a background principle of state property law applicable to
forego compensation-then the primary question would be a factual
one of whether there was a total deprivation.
Under Penn Central, by contrast, the inquiry would likely focus
primarily on the reasonable expectations of owners in light of the
with property interests at issue might be nominal, depending on whether the shares or other
property rights actually had any value in the context of a failing company.
48. Claims that are being made on behalf of the nationalized firms themselves that their
property was siphoned off for public purposes while the government was in control might be
seen as closer to a direct taking.
49. 438 U.S. 104, 123 (1978) ("In engaging in these essentially ad hoc, factual inquiries [for
regulatory takings], the Court's decisions have identified several factors that have particular
significance. The economic impact of the regulation on the claimant and, particularly, the ex-
tent to which the regulation has interfered with distinct investment-backed expectations are,
of course, relevant considerations. So, too, is the character of the governmental action." (internal
citations omitted)).
50. 505 U.S. 1003 (1992).
51. Id. at 1027-28 (noting that "in the case of personal property, by reason of the State's
traditionally high degree of control over commercial dealings, [an owner] ought to be aware of
the possibility that new regulation might even render his property economically worthless (at
least if the property s only economically productive use is sale or manufacture for sale)").
52. See Eduardo Moisis Penalver, Is Land Special? The Unjustified Preference for
Landownership in Regulatory Takings Law, 31 ECOLOGY L.Q. 227 (2004) (discussing lower
court decisions that have rejected the Lucas distinction between real and personal property
for purposes of applying a per se test).
200
NATIONALIZATION AND NECESSITY
relevant type of firm and the nature of economic ownership in large,
publicly traded companies." Certainly, most shareholders should
expect that regulation can change the economic landscape in which
companies operate, even for companies that are not as heavily regu-
lated as Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac have been (or banks and sim-
ilar financial institutions generally are).5 4 But it is a closer question
with respect to an actual government takeover, even under the ex-
traordinary circumstances of an economic crisis that are present when
companies face not only failure, but failure that threatens wider eco-
nomic harm. It is reasonable for shareholders to expect that the gov-
ernment will not directly appropriate their ownership stake for its
own purposes, and that would seem to apply to the collateral conse-
quences of public investments to rescue firms whose failure threatens
significant, imminent macroeconomic harm."
In the background for shareholder claims is the possibility of bank-
ruptcy, even for companies that had not actually failed at the time of
nationalization.5 6 If shareholders would have been wiped out in the
absence of public intervention, it is hard to see how they should be
able to recover in a takings claim. But it is not entirely clear that
such demise was inevitable or that shareholders would necessarily
have been lost all economic value even in a collapse. Even if a com-
pany is likely to end up in bankruptcy, it is not necessarily the case
that all shareholder value would be subordinate to claims of creditors.
Where there is insufficient residual value, shareholders are unlikely
to retain any value in bankruptcy. In some ways, this is a question
of the certainty of the impending demise. A short-term crisis is not
the same thing as an actual collapse and an early intervention may
53. Questions under the Penn Central analysis regarding economic impact, as with the
issue of total deprivation or not, require factual development that remains contested in those
suits that have actually been filed.
54. Cf Christopher T. Curtis, The Takings Clause andRegulatory Takeovers ofBanks and
Thrifts, 27 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 367, 373-74 (1990) (discussing the role of expectation in heavily
regulated financial industries). The federal government has raised a version of this argument
in the Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac suits. See Defendant's Motion to Dismiss at 30, Wash.
Fed. v. United States, No. 1: 13-cv-00385-MMS (D.D.C. Nov. 7, 2013) (analogizing Fannie and
Freddie to banks subject to resolution authority).
55. A non-trivial argument can be made that for many shareholders, any loss from the
nationalization of one firm may be compensated implicitly in offsetting gains to the larger
economy. That is because shareholders, as a general matter, should not bear firm-specific risk
given how easy diversification is to achieve and the fact that no premium should be paid for
bearing overly concentrated investments.
56. Cf Morrison, supra note 24.
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have left shareholders in a worse position than it might have seemed
at the time.
Moreover, as noted, there is a serious question of whether the ac-
quiescence of boards of directors to a takeover renders any takings
challenges by shareholders moot. Shareholders are contesting the
voluntary nature of those approvals, but even if that argument fails,
it does not necessarily follow that such board action precludes claims
by those harmed by an agreement between the board (on behalf of the
corporate entity) and the government. A claim based on collateral
damage to shareholders would not be outside the mainstream of tak-
ings claims in other contexts. 7
In sum, there is a plausible argument that at least some of the
claims currently being asserted in challenging nationalization in the
Great Recession are viable as a threshold matter under the Takings
Clause, and the suits are proceeding apace. Even if not all of the
claims being raised succeed, the issue of takings liability will inevi-
tably shadow future economic crises. How, then, to understand the
fundamental nature of what the government does in this situation-
as an aberration or as an extension of the fabric of takings doctrine?
It is to that question we now turn.
III. A DOCTRINE OF ECONOMIC EMERGENCY
Shifting our focus, then, nationalization-even without compensat-
ing shareholders-for firms whose failure would significantly threaten
our interconnected economy can be justified for the same reasons that
certain acute emergencies have historically fallen outside the scope
of the Takings Clause. I recognize that such an exercise in analogical
reasoning requires significant caveats, which I will explore below. But
the parallels between traditional overriding necessity and the kind
of emergency presented by the potential failure of firms that pose par-
ticularly significant systemic risks in the midst of economic crisis are
surprisingly apt.
A. From Physical Threats to Systemic Economic Risk
In the law of takings, there is a well-recognized tradition of consti-
tutional latitude granted to officials to respond to imminent threats
57. E.g., Armstrong v. United States, 364U.S. 40, 48 (1960) (taking arising from the exercise
of governmental contract right that rendered liens unenforceable).
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to the public through the appropriation or even destruction of pri-
vate property without compensation." As the Supreme Court noted
in Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, officials have long had
the authority to harm or even destroy "'real and personal property,
in cases of actual necessity, to prevent the spreading of a fire' or to
forestall other grave threats to the lives and property of others.""
This constitutional doctrine of emergency parallels a tort doctrine of
public necessity that provides a limited, but clear, exemption from
liability to avert imminent harm.60
There are two primary areas where constitutional immunity for
emergency has traditionally arisen. The first has involved military
necessity, primarily in times of war.61 Cases have arisen, for example,
involving the destruction of privately owned assets-bridges and
refineries, for example6 2 -tracing all the way back to claims made
58. There is a related, although not entirely parallel, doctrine of private necessity that pro-
vides a privilege against trespass. One primary difference between public necessity and pri-
vate necessity is that in the latter context, although a private actor is not liable for the act of
trespass, the actor is generally liable for any harm that results from the privileged entry. See
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 197 (1965). For private necessity, courts tend to require
that an action be taken to preserve life or property. Moreover, any individual who invokes the
defense must be reasonable in their actions and cannot exploit the privilege beyond what is
required under the circumstances. Generally, then, courts will look for evidence indicating a
strong relationship between the action taken and the harm averted, and the stronger the rela-
tionship, the more likely the doctrine of private necessity will be found to apply to the situation.
59. 505 U.S. 1003, 1029 n. 16 (1992) (quoting Bowditch v. City of Boston, 101 U.S. 16, 18
(1880)).
60. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 196 ("One is privileged to enter land in the
possession of another if it is, or if the actor reasonably believes it to be, necessary for the pur-
pose of averting an imminent public disaster."); id. § 262 ("One is privileged to commit an act
which would otherwise be a trespass to a chattel or a conversion if the act is or is reasonably
believed to be necessary for the purpose of avoiding a public disaster."). Public officials have
historically faced both tort suits and constitutional actions, hence the intertwined nature of
the takings emergency jurisprudence and the tort doctrine of public necessity.
61. During World War I, for example, the federal government temporarily nationalized
critical infrastructure, such as railroads and telegraphs (and including even the Smith & Wesson
Company). Again in World War II, the federal government nationalized transportation and
energy companies important to the war effort. Perhaps the apogee of the rationale-and func-
tionally likely the reason it is no longer deployed with any regularity-involved the events that
gave rise to Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. u. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952). In this case, not often
discussed by property theorists, although exceedingly familiar to scholars of the separation
of powers as the Steel Seizure case, the Supreme Court rejected President Truman's attempt
to nationalize the steel industry during the Korean War pursuant to nothing more than an
Executive Order.
62. See, e.g., United States v. Caltex (Phil.), Inc., 344 U.S. 149 (1952) (holding that de-
struction of oil facilities in the Philippines during battle in World War II did not constitute
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during the American Revolution.63 In this context, emergency doc-
trine has been drawn somewhat narrowly, perhaps recognizing the
potentially all-encompassing nature of military need. There are also
national security considerations at play that make the tradition of
military necessity a somewhat uncomfortable basis to find grounding
for a doctrine of economic emergency in takings.
However, a second, more immediately relevant, context in which
state action in times of crisis is excused from takings liability in-
volves steps taken to prevent disasters in the face of imminent phys-
ical threats such as spreading wildfires, flooding, and contagious
disease.64 To pick one of any number of historical examples by way
of illustration, in American Print Works v. Lawrence, the Mayor of
New York City and two Alderman were found not liable in trespass,
and no takings were held to have occurred, following their decision
to use gun powder to blow up the buildings at 44 and 46 Exchange
Place-and in the process destroy "800 cases prints; 70,000 pieces
prints; 50 cases drillings; 1000 pieces drillings, and a large quantity
of prints, drillings, and other dry goods, wares, and merchandizes of
great value, to wit, of the value of two hundred thousand dollars."65
The officials made the decision to destroy the storehouse in the face
of what was then "one of the most extensive fires ever known in this
country, and property, both real and personal, to the value of many
millions of dollars was destroyed, much the larger portion being
a compensable taking under the Fifth Amendment); Juragua Iron Co. v. United States, 212
U.S. 297 (1909) (finding no recovery for owners of a factory destroyed by soldiers fighting in
Cuba to prevent the spread of disease); United States v. Pac. R.R, 120 U.S. 227, 239 (1887)
(recognizing "the exemption of government from liability for private property injured or
destroyed during war, by the operations of armies in the field, or by measures necessary for
their safety and efficiency" in a case involving federal government destruction of private
property during the Civil War).
63. See Respublica v. Sparhawk, 1 U.S. (1 Dall.) 357, 1 L.Ed. 174 (Pa. 1788) (holding that
there was no recovery for destruction of property where the British were on the verge of tak-
ing Philadelphia).
64. See John Alan Cohan, Private and Public Necessity and the Violation of Property
Rights, 83 N.D. L. REV. 651, 719, 728 (2007); see also Susan S. Kuo, Disaster Tradeoffs: The
Doubtful Case for Public Necessity, 54 B.C. L. REV. 127, 131 (2013). There is a similar doctrine
of immunity from compensation for property harmed in the course of police actions (in the
sense of law enforcement, not in sense of the general police power). See Derek T. Muller, "As
Much upon Tradition as upon Principle": A Critique of the Privilege of Necessity Destruction
Under the Fifth Amendment, 82 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 481, 497 (2006).
65. 21 N.J.L. 248 (1847).
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consumed by the flames."66 Similar cases have been a staple of takings
(and tort) jurisprudence since the time of the Founding-and before.67
The logic of uncompensated taking in the emergency context seems
to rest on a number of foundations. First, in many instances the prop-
erty at issue would have been destroyed regardless of the actions of
public officials, so if, for example, a house is destroyed to stop a wild-
fire that would have destroyed that house regardless, the owner can
hardly complain.6 8 But not all instances of emergency action fall into
this category. An alternative explanation might be that invoking ne-
cessity in situations of crisis represents a particularly acute collective
action problem that justifies swift action even without compensation.6 9
There is much to this, but a final rationale, and the one that seems
most clearly to explain the doctrine, is that vulnerability to this kind
of exigency is inherent in the obligations of ownership and member-
ship in a community.70
66. Id. at 261 (Randolph, J., concurring).
67. See, e.g., Field v. City of Des Moines, 39 Iowa 575 (1874). Bowditch V. City of Boston,
101 U.S. 16 (1880), is probably the best know of these early emergency cases, byvirtue of Justice
Scalia's invocation of the case in Lucas. See supra text accompanying note 59. The facts of
Bowditch echo so many of the urban firebreak cases in the crowded cities of the nineteenth
century. In the face of "great fire [that] occurred in the city of Boston on the night of the 9th
and 10th of November, 1872," fire engineers decided to demolish a building that was in the path
of the fire; the building was blown up (destroying "fixtures, merchandise, and tools belonging
to [the plaintiff] . . . of the value of $60,000" as well as the value of the plaintiffs leasehold
estate), which "stopped the progress of the fire." Id.
68. As applied to economic emergencies, the analogy could be that if a company is national-
ized but would have gone under in the absence of public intervention, that is no different from
a house being destroyed that would have been burnt regardless. However, as noted, it can be
quite contestable whether a company would have failed and even if so, whether shareholders
would necessarily have lost the share value or control rights they did.
69. Richard Epstein has argued that common-law necessity doctrine can be justified as
a limited intrusion on otherwise absolute property rights where transaction costs prevent gains
from trade. Richard Epstein, Property and Necessity, 13 HARv. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 2,7 (1990)
("Under certain localized circumstances, however, conferring ... absolute rights to exclude
does not advance competition in ordinary markets, but rather it creates bilateral monopoly,
holdout problems, and transaction-cost obstacles of one sort or another. At common law it is
just these various situations in which there is a systematic, intuitive willingness to back off the
comprehensive ideal of property in favor of a system that is a little bit frayed at the edges.").
If one translates that logic from common-law judges to other legal actors, and from private to
public actors, the basic rationale remains. This rationale can then translate fairly directly to
the emergency exception for just compensation.
70. Cf Andrea L. Peterson, The Takings Clause: In Search of Underlying Principles-
Part II Takings as Intentional Deprivations of Property Without Moral Justification, 78
CALIF. L. REV. 55, 85-93 (1990).
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This emergency exception has not generally been applied to the
kinds of "grave threats," to quote the Court in Lucas, that arise out
of economic crises, but the logic of doing so is compelling. As the above
discussion of systemic risk illustrates, there are certain firms whose
potential demise threatens not only localized economic harm, but a
kind of ripple effect that can injure broad swaths of the economy, and
in some cases the economy as a whole. The increasingly interconnected
nature of economic activity places certain firms at a nexus point where
the consequences of failure can induce economic panic and damage
every bit as fast-moving as a wildfire. Public officials have many policy
tools available when such an economic wildfire starts, including, of
course, doing nothing and letting markets react, which is what hap-
pens when most firms fail. But creating financial firebreaks through
nationalization is a response that echoes a long tradition of legitimate
necessity in constitutional property, whatever one might think of the
merits or wisdom of any given choice to apply the policy.7 1
The merits of drawing on a well-established doctrinal tradition, in
the best (constitutional) common-law tradition, is that this kind of
analogical exercise can suggest several important limiting principles
to cabin an exercise of authority legitimately open to concern about
abuse. The analogy thus suggests, as an important constraint, that
any doctrine of economic emergency would require a genuine threat
(defined here in terms of the harms arising from the systemic risk
posed by the potential failure of a firm) as well as imminence-that
71. To be clear, the gravamen of the argument here is that the traditional jurisprudence
of emergency in the law of takings supplies a foundation for a similar doctrine in the context
of economic crises, but the argument is not that emergency creates executive authority where
there is none. The Supreme Court has been skeptical of invocations of economic emergency since
at least A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. u. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 528 (1935) ("Undoubtedly,
the conditions to which power is addressed are always to be considered when the exercise of
power is challenged. Extraordinary conditions may call for extraordinary remedies. But the
argument necessarily stops short of an attempt to justify action which lies outside the sphere
of constitutional authority. Extraordinary conditions do not create or enlarge constitutional
power."). Nonetheless, emergency is clearly a legitimate basis for understanding the contours
of constitutional authority that already exists. See, e.g., Block v. Hirsh, 256 U.S. 135 (1921)
(noting that "a public exigency will justify the legislature in restricting property rights in land
to a certain extent without compensation" in upholding emergency rent control during World
War I); see also Home Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398, 426 (1934) ("While
emergency does not create power, emergency may furnish the occasion for the exercise of
power.... The constitutional question presented in the light of an emergency is whether the
power possessed embraces the particular exercise of it in response to particular conditions.").
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officials must act quickly to forestall that grave harm. Moreover, in-
herent in all emergency rationales is the constraint that officials must
be acting reasonably in the face of such threats.7 2
Although military necessity jurisprudence is less directly relevant
than the disaster and public health cases, one distinction the Supreme
Court has drawn in the former context can supply another important
limiting principle for economic emergencies. In cases of military ne-
cessity, the Court has long distinguished between immediate threats
and military actions that seem designed to satisfy a public need that
could otherwise be met through the market, such as where property
is "taken for the service of our armies, such as vessels, steam-boats,
and the like, for the transport of troops and munitions of war, or build-
ings to be used as store-house and places of deposit of war material,
or to house soldiers or take care of the sick, or claims for supplies
seized and appropriated."7
In other words, if a public actor is appropriating or destroying prop-
erty to respond to an immediate crisis, that necessity is more likely
to be recognized as an exigency that can obviate compensation, but
if the motivation (or consequence) is to supply the government with
a benefit that the government could have procured, then claims of
necessity willbe met with greater skepticism.74 This echoes the gen-
eral argument that Joseph Sax made that takings liability is appropri-
ate where the government seeks to benefit itself, but there should be
no liability where the government is merely adjusting economic re-
lations.75 Given legitimate concerns about the risk of aggrandizement
72. As the Texas Supreme Court emphasized in a case rejecting the application of the
emergency doctrine in a case under the Texas Constitution,
one who dynamites a house to stop the spread of a conflagration that threatens
a town, or shoots a mad dog in the street, or burns clothing infected with small-
pox germs, or, in time of war, destroys property which should not be allowed to
fall into the hands of the enemy, is not liable to the owner, so long as the
emergency is great enough, and he has acted reasonably under the circumstances.
Steele v. City of Houston, 603 S.W.2d 786, 792 (Tex. 1980) (citing WILLIAM L. PROSSER, THE
LAW OF TORTS § 24 (4th ed. 1971)) (emphasis added).
73. United States v. Pacific R.R., 120 U.S. 227, 239 (1887).
74. The analysis may not be the same for actions taken by authorities after the initial
takeovers, when the entities involved had been returned to positions of financial stability.
However, the initial compensability of the takeovers is a distinct question from the validity
of subsequent actions once the firms were nationalized.
75. See Joseph L. Sax, Takings and the Police Power, 74 YALE L.J. 36, 63 (1964) (" [W]hen
economic loss is incurred as a result of government enhancement of its resource position in
its enterprise capacity, then compensation is constitutionally required; it is that result which
is to be characterized as a taking. But losses, however severe, incurred as a consequence of
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in economic nationalization, this strain of the necessity rationale
can be a vital constraint.76
There are reasonable arguments to be made, of course, against the
analogy between physical and financial threats. Perhaps the most
salient is the question of imminence. After all, the GM bankruptcy
process played out over the course of months and even AIG and the
GSEs arguably might have bought some time had other policy inter-
ventions been tried. However, the immediacy of the relevant threat
should be measured in terms of public and market reaction to fail-
ure to act, rather than the time it takes for a policy to reach fruition.
Properly viewed this way, economic emergencies are not significantly
different for businesses whose failure poses systemic risks than when
a wildfire is raging, even if it may take time for officials to align the
necessary institutions to allow action.8 Markets today can react al-
most instantaneously to signals from public officials and even the
possibility that certain firms might fail in the absence of public action
can cause significant public harm.9
government acting merely in its arbitral capacity are to be viewed as a non-compensable
exercise of the police power.").
76. In the Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, and AIG suits, one set of arguments that the claimants
are making is that the takeovers in each case were not designed to forestall financial panic or
even stabilize critical aspects of the economy but rather to directly benefit the federal govern-
ment itself. For example, in the GSE suits, the allegations relating to the sweep of profits to
the federal government are essentially arguments that the conservatorships were thinly dis-
guised ways of pumping money into the federal treasury. See Complaint, Washington Federal,
supra note 4, at 65. Considering the amount of public subsidy-and the genuine uncertainty
about the outcome of the interventions in each case-this argument is hard to credit on its face.
Nationalization that represents a surgical intervention, and particularly one that is temporary,
is better understood as a move (wise or not) to stabilize markets, rather than expropriation to
benefit the government itself. There are legitimate reasons why some members of a polarized
public may question this logic. See Levitin, supra note 23. But I think the better understanding
of the governmental actions at issue-at least in the initial nationalization-is that they were
not aggrandizing.
77. As noted, emergency doctrine generally requires imminent danger and an actual emer-
gency that establishes the necessity. See, e.g., TrinCo nv. Co. v. United States, 722 F.3d 1375,
1378 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (doctrine not appropriate to be invoked when the Forest Service was
undertaking prophylactic, rather than emergency, wildfire prevention).
78. The Great Recession demonstrated, however, that public institutions can sometimes
move extremely quickly in the face of true looming public disaster. In the midst of the recent
crisis, particularly in its early days, federal officials often had to act more like private deal-
makers, forcing them, as Steven Davidoff and David Zaring have argued, to "decide quickly,
negotiate hard, consider transaction and other costs to the best they can, and then call it a
day." Davidoff & Zaring, supra note 3, at 467.
79. Arguments about the comparative significance of the relevant types of threat-that
fire or disease are of a different order of magnitude than economic harm-or even some
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Moreover, the context of economic emergency no doubt presents
significantly greater complexity than a fast-moving fire or a rapidly
spreading disease. An official may be able to watch a fire approaching
and reasonably conclude with relatively little information that the
destruction of property is an appropriate precautionary measure to
lessen the risk of a larger conflagration. An economic crisis sufficiently
grave to threaten larger macroeconomic harm, on the other hand, may
be hard to define. We have suffered many significant downturns, such
as the stock market crash in 1987 crash and the end of the tech bub-
ble, all without significant takeovers. Even if the threshold condition
of a sufficient emergency canbe discerned, delineating between appro-
priate "firebreaks" and other firms that should be left to the market,
regardless of the consequences, is exceedingly difficult.o
For all of these reasons, some takings theorists have been troubled
by the concept of emergency or necessity as a justification for vitiating
a compensation mandate." The argument for applying emergency to
economic crisis is admittedly novel, and the Court has been reluctant
to expand immunity from takings liability beyond categories tradition-
ally recognized in common law. But many lower courts understand
formalist taxonomical objection, make little sense. In the kind of shock that the failure of the
most interconnected and economically significant firms might bring, there are very real and
extremely wide-spread harms that result, and such harms can last far longer than the aftermath
of a wildfire.
80. Because nationalization so often involves action at the federal, rather than state (or
local) level, it does present a paradigm of takings that inverts the traditional locus of eminent
domain at the state level. Simply by dint of the docket, most foundational questions of takings
law involve challenges to state and local regulation or eminent domain, and any doctrine
developed in the context of federal law must be sensitive to the consequences for states and
localities. That said, traditional emergency doctrine in takings jurisprudence much more often
involved such state and local entities, so the extension of the doctrine to the economic sphere
would not be entirely orthogonal to past experience. Nonetheless, if an economic emergency
doctrine is grounded in the nature of extraordinary systemic risk, that fact might suggest cau-
tion in states and local governments invoking the rationale, given the risks of inconsistency
across states and the limits of a national perspective for such sub-federal governments.
81. See, e.g., John J. Costonis, Presumptive and Per Se Takings: A Decisional Model for
the Takings Issue, 58 N.Y.U. L. REV. 465, 487 n.94 (1983) (describing the "necessity" and
"emergency' cases as "among the Court's most troublesome takings precedents because they
lack a basis in principle"). Peter Byrne has noted that emergency and related doctrines have
"stood on the fringes of regulatory takings doctrine because giving them full effect would come
close to abolishing any normative foundation for regulatory takings generally." J. Peter Byrne,
The Cathedral Engulfed: Sea-Level Rise, Property Rights, and Time, 73 LA. L. REV. 69, 93
(2012). But this anxiety ignores the pedigree of the privilege and the not-insignificant boundaries
that courts have historically placed around the doctrine. Whether that is more or less norma-
tively destabilizing than the many other ambiguities in takings doctrine is hard to say.
PROPERTY RIGHTS CONFERENCE JOURNAL [Vol. 3:187
that definitions of harm and public exigencies can evolve over time,
and these complexities are ultimately judicially manageable.
In short, while the traditional law of emergency in takings would
import significant constraints on the invocation of the rationale to
support nationalization of systemically important firms in economic
emergencies, the extension of the doctrine in this way makes eminent
sense. It is important doctrinally to give reasonable latitude to the
judgment of officials in the thick of crisis, even if, in the calm after the
storm, other avenues might seem to have been preferable. All of this,
then, gives us the rough outlines of a doctrine of economic emergency
in takings that bears directly on the practice of nationalization.
B. Economic Externalities and Irreconcilable Choices?
To this point, the argument has sought to ground a takings doctrine
for nationalization that reflects, and extends, traditional emergency
rationales. There is a closely related jurisprudential vein in consti-
tutional property, however, that might supply an even broader doc-
trinal grounding for nationalization. Public officials are sometimes
faced with the choice of irreconcilable economic conflicts reflecting
the harm that one owner's property threatens to cause another owner.
In a situation posing this kind of irreconcilable choice, officials may
legitimately choose one set of economic interests over another.
This logic is familiar from the cedar rust tree disease case, Miller
v. Schoene,8 2 where the Court articulated the dilemma as follows:
[T]he state was under the necessity of making a choice between
the preservation of one class of property and that of the other
wherever both existed in dangerous proximity. It would have
been none the less a choice if, instead of enacting the present
statute, the state, by doing nothing, had permitted serious injury
to the apple orchards within its borders to go on unchecked. When
forced to such a choice the state does not exceed its constitutional
powers by deciding upon the destruction of one class of property
in order to save another which, in the judgment of the legislature,
is of greater value to the public."
82. 276 U.S. 272 (1928).
83. Id. at 279.
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This recognition of the harm principal can apply as well to modern
economic harms caused by private entities in companies whose failure
poses systemic risks. Miller was a due process, not a takings case, and
the Court appeared to distance itself from the case in Lucas.84 But the
proposition has not been explicitly disavowed and, even transformed,
can be seen in the Lucas understanding of background principles of
state law as a limitation on per se takings liability.
As with other necessity-based rationales, the Miller doctrine is
not unlimited and must be grounded in the reasonable exercise of
authority, however deferentially construed. The reason for relying
on the emergency doctrine as a basis for justifying nationalization
in times of economic crisis is that a Miller-esque economic nuisance
argument is harder to cabin and harder, perhaps ironically, to oper-
ationalize. Relying on the tradition of imminent necessity, rather
than a broader conception of harm and incompatibility, is thus a
sounder foundation for what might be understood as a novel exten-
sion of economic authority.
IV. NATIONALIZATION, NECESSITY, AND THE RULE OF LAW
Even if one were to accept the argument that the emergency doc-
trine should logically be extended to contemporary economic dangers,
one might still object more fundamentally to the idea of invoking crisis
and systemic risk to affect the landscape of takings law, regardless
of the nature of the emergency. Nationalization is a term that for
many people invokes visions of unconstrained dictatorial authority-
think banana republic"-and all the more so if there are grounds
for taking control of companies without compensating those harmed
by that action.
Indeed, some commentators have argued that it is precisely in
times of crisis that protection for property rights-taken somewhat
narrowly to mean constraint on public authority to adjust economic
benefits and burdens-should be at its highest level. Todd Zywicki,
84. See Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1022-23 (1992) ("The
'harmful or noxious uses' principle was the Court's early attempt to describe in theoretical terms
why government may, consistent with the Takings Clause, affect property values by regulation
without incurring an obligation to compensate-a reality we nowadays acknowledge explicitly
with respect to the full scope of the State's police power.").
85. Cf Ashton B. Inniss, Rethinking Political Risk Insurance: Incentives for Investor Risk
Mitigation, 16 Sw. J. INT'LL. 477 (2010).
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for example, argues that the purpose of property rights (and the rule
of law more generally) is to provide "as much stability as possible"
to facilitate the "economic coordination" that economic activity re-
quires, and in emergencies more than ever.86 Zywicki gives the fol-
lowing example:
Consider the milk in your refrigerator or cafeteria. Think of the
chain of coordination required to get it there: Farmers must de-
cide to use their land to graze dairy cows; determine how many
cows to graze; and employ people and use machinery to milk the
cows, pasteurize the milk, and deliver it into the stream of com-
merce. All the coordination in that relatively simple chain of
production must then align with millions of consumers deciding
whether to buy milk or Coke and ensuring that they can buy
both milk and Cheerio's. The extent to which these systems are
coordinated is remarkable.87
Zywicki, drawing on Friedrich Hayek, argues that complex economic
activity not only requires this kind of coordination but involves con-
stant informational feedbacks to adjust.88 State intervention to re-
spond to market failures short-circuits this feedback mechanism and
the resulting uncertainty, so the argument goes, undermines incen-
tives for private investment.
However, these kinds of arguments about the necessity of stability
and the rule of law in constitutional property ignore another side to
the ledger of expectations about property. Zywicki's milk may require
Herculean market coordination to get from the cow to the consumer's
cup, but such complex markets are apt not only to be much less ef-
ficient in the absence of a baseline of regulatory protection in the
ordinary course,90 but reveal their greatest weaknesses in times of
86. See Todd Zywicki, Economic Uncertainty, the Courts, and the Rule of Law, 35 HARV.
J.L. & PUB. POLY 195 (2012).
87. Id. at 197 (footnote omitted).
88. Id.
89. Id. at 199. Zywicki makes some leaps in causation that are hard to support. For example,
Zywicki argues that the reason credit markets have been slow to return after the crisis is be-
cause "political response to the financial crisis (or perhaps more accurately rationalized as a
response to the financial crisis) created a huge amount of instability that makes it hard to price
a loan." Id. at 198. The real reason banks were slow to extend credit in the aftermath of the
housing crisis, however, is most likely not policy-induced "instability" but much more likely
the very inability of the Hayekian information chain to allow lenders to accurately assess (and
price) risk in the face of market failure.
90. See Joseph W. Singer, Things That We Would Like to Take for Granted: Minimum
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economic crisis. For markets to work, property rights must be appro-
priately calibrated and all the more so during times of emergency.
Hanoch Dagan has mounted a broader challenge to expropriation
without compensation as an affront to the rule of law that has rele-
vance here as well.91 Dagan asserts that any constitutional doctrine
that offers less than fair market value for takings offends two aspects
of the rule of law. First, drawing on Joseph Raz, Dagan argues that
judicial validation of non-compensatory takings fails to provide the
guidance necessary for people to form clear expectations about how
authorities will exercise their coercive power, which in turn is critical
to the value of autonomy.92 Second, the case-by-case method through
which compensation practices are determined threatens the rule of
law value, Dagan continues, that seeks to constrain the arbitrary
exercise of power.93
These are important concerns-and Dagan acknowledges that
takings without full compensation can be justified on the grounds
of the reciprocal obligations that owners have as members of a com-
munity, which I think best explains traditional emergency doctrine
in takings 94-but his concern with guidance and arbitrary exercise
of power risks a kind of circularity. In practice, the kinds of stan-
dards that tend to dominate takings law actually provide a significant
amount of notice to owners and the broad sweep of litigation on tak-
ings tends to generate rule-like categories that are quite intelligible.95
As Joseph Singer has noted, "while the ad hoc test looks vague on
paper, it is highly predictable in practice. The courts entertain a strong
presumption that regulations of property are legitimate if passed by
legislatures to promote public ends."96 Indeed, Singer rightly notes,
"the Penn Central test is more predictable than a seemingly rigid rule
that would prevent changes in 'established property rights' given
Standards for the Legal Framework of aFree andDemocratic Society, 2 HARv. L. & POLY REV.
139 (2008).
91. See Hanoch Dagan, Expropriatory Compensation, Distributive Justice, and the Rule
of Law, in RETHINKING PUBLIC INTEREST IN EXPROPRIATION LAW (H. Mostert & LCAVerstappen
eds., forthcoming 2014), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract-id=2345115.
92. See id. at 6 (citing Joseph Raz, The Rule of Law and Its Virtues, in THE AUTHORITY OF
LAW: ESSAYS ON LAW AND MORALITY 210, 213, 218 (1979)).
93. Id. at 6-7.
94. See supra text accompanying notes 68-70.
95. See Joseph William Singer, The Rule ofReason in Property Law, 46 U.C. DAVIS L. REV.
1369, 1402-05 (2013).
96. Id. at 1405.
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the need to interpret what those rights are before they can be defined
as immune from change without compensation."9
Moreover, whether the judicial validation of expropriatory practices
that do not provide compensation represent the arbitrary exercise of
power depends heavily on one's view of the discretion being deployed.
If a policy of intervention to solve a potentially devastating market
collapse-as one example of a reason why compensation might not
be granted-seems like an excuse for officials to advance some more
nefarious goal, then such steps will seem arbitrary regardless of the
legality of the process through which such power has been exercised.
This is partly a cultural question, and it was evident in much of the
popular reaction to nationalization during the Great Recession. Ulti-
mately, though, it requires some external metric of arbitrariness to
say that an exercise of the power to interfere with property rights,
including compensationless expropriation, necessarily violates this
aspect of the rule of law.
It is reasonable to raise questions about the arbitrariness of the
exercise of power the longer the government remains in control of an
entity. Economic nationalization that involves forestalling market fail-
ure and restoring the health of a systematically important firm may
take on a different cast-and raise increasing risks-if that control
continues longer than necessary to respond to an emergency. Fannie
Mae and Freddie Mac remain under conservatorship, while AIG and
GM and others have be re-privatized, and it is not surprising that the
conservatorships have generated ongoing questions about the purpose
and role of federal control." This does not change the calculus in
moments of crisis, but is worth reflecting on for the ultimate legiti-
macy of any instance of nationalization.
In short, while it is fair to argue that extraordinary departures from
what property law demands in the name of emergency may undermine
the rule of law, nationalization-so present throughout our history,
as much as we tend to forget the fact-is not such a departure. The
critical point about the rule of law here is that, as uncomfortable as
this reality might be, a doctrine that acknowledges the kind of limited
intervention represented in our tradition of nationalization would
97. Id.
98. See, e.g., Nick Timiraos, Fannie-Freddie Fate Rests in Courts: Shareholder Suits




not be outside the bounds of law but deeply consonant with the oldest
pathways of the takings clause.
CONCLUSION
One might question the wisdom or the foresight of any of the in-
stances of nationalization that occurred in responding to the Great
Recession and there is no doubt that, in the heat of the moment, of-
ficials likely made mistakes. In the early months of the crisis, a great
deal of debate swirled around which companies should be saved or
left to their fate-why Bear Stearns and not Lehman?-and it was
difficult for officials to anticipate how events would play out given
that all indications pointed toward a rapidly spreading global eco-
nomic meltdown.
There is a difference, however, between policy concerns about na-
tionalization and constitutional arguments for barring the practice
without compensation, which would likely forestall the practice al-
together. How one views the wisdom of nationalization in any given
instance is inherently complicated, and my own perspective is that
this is a valuable policy tool if used carefully, recognizing the risk of
abuse, as with all public authority. But that debate is one that is
better carried out in a political, rather than judicial, arena.
It does no violence to norms of ownership-or the rule of law-to
acknowledge that overriding necessity in times of crisis can be as rele-
vant to economic emergency as it has always been to more prosaic
threats. The doctrine of economic emergency that this Essay has pro-
posed accords with the deepest traditions of our system of property,
and rightly should be so recognized.
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